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PREFATORY NOTE

The Area Studies Programs within the International Programs Office
of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst initiated in 1976 a series
of Occasional papers to provide an outlet for both informal and formal
scholarly works of a generci interest to the University community. In
1978 the first numbers in this series devoted to issues and themes related
to Asia were introduced under the sponsorship of the Asian Studies Com
mittee at the University. The initial three papers deal with topics in
Japan, China and Laos. In future papers topics will be presented which
encompass the major regions of Asia; East Asia (China, Japan, Korea);
South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka); and Southeast Asia
(Burma;- Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, and Vietnam). Comments on the individual papers and the entire
series are welcome and encouraged.
Professor Stephen E. Pe1z is Associate Professor of History at the
University of Massachusetts at Amherst. He has worked in Japanese dip
lomatic and military archives and has published a book titled Race to
Pearl Harbor: The Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World
War II (Harvard, 1974) for which he was named cowinner of the Bernath
prize of the Society for the History of American Foreign Relations.
In this paper Professor Pe1z reviews the historical 1iterq ture on
Japanese imperialism in the 1930s and argues that a new consensus has
developed: Japan adopted imperialism as a defense against western pres
sure. He then proceeds to revise this view by exploring the motives of
four men who pushed Japan down the road to empire at critica1'moments,
and he concludes that Japan's imperial impulse came from within Japan
itself. Japanese military leaders believed that it was their duty to use
modern weapons and new planning methods to create an empire which would
embody and expand traditicna1 oriental values and social arrangements, and
he argues that their combined idealism and militarism made them
partic
ularly dangerous to world order. Japanese imperialism, then, was a spec
ial variant in the history of imperial expansion.

THE GOOD EMPIRE:

JAPAN I S NEW ORDER AT HOME AND ABROAD

He who cares neither about his life, nor about his fame, nor about
rank or money--such a man is hard to deal with •••• Yet it is only such
a man who will undergo every hardship withhis companions in order to
carry out great work for the country.
saigo Takamori
Saigo Takamori, one of the leaders of the Meiji Restoration, hated
the new era which he had helped to create, for modernization required
the end of the samurai and the rise of businessmen.

To save his class

and to preserve the unique Japanese virtues which the warriors embodied,
he demanded that the new government give them the main role in Japan's
rise to international dignity and power; in 1873 he proposed to lead the
conquest of Korea, and when his colleagues in the government rejected
his plan, he led a suicidal rebellion.

By the end of the century, he

had become a national hero, whose personal sacrifice inspired Japan's
soldiers in their successful Korean and Chinese adventures.

During the

first years of Meiji, however, international success seemed far less
certain; consequently, Okubo Toshimichi and the other realistic leaders
had suffered from constant tension.
They were confident that their country was spiritually strong--that
Japan was a good society--but at the same time they feared that Japan was
militarily

vu1nerab1~

their shores.

to the western powers whose ships cruised along

By the 1930's, the reverse was true.

The western warships

were gone, and many Japanese leaders had forgotten their fears of mi1i
tary weakness.

Between 1931 and 1938, Japan broke with the Wilsonian

international order of the twenties and set out to build a great empire.
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But at the same time, many of Japan's leaders began to doubt their coun
try's spiritual strength and social stability.

Admirals Kato Kanji and

Suetsugu Nobumasa, General Koiso Kuniaki, and Lieutenant General Ishiwara
Kanji all feared that westernization would undermine the traditional
beliefs which they valued most.

They met the challenge to Japan's nation

al tradition by trying to restore order at home, build a good empire in
Asia, and synthesize the best elements of eastern and western culture.
The Problem of Japanese Imperialism
Japanese foreign policy during the thirties has puzzled many scholars
in the past, and sad to say, may continue to do so even after this article
appears.
dealt

Much of the work done on the subject since World War II has

with the conditions which made expansion possible:

the political

strength of the Japanese military and the weakness of their domestic
opponents; assassinations by the radical right; the fragmented decision
making process; the West's economic troubles, its military weakness, its
diplomatic confusions, and the rise of European totalitarian regimes and
Chinese nationalism. l

Three schools of interpreters have gone beyond

these boundary conditions to examine the underlying motives of the Japan
ese leaders themselves:

the conspiracy advocates, the Maruyama school,

and the revisionists.
The conspiracy thesis has attracted both the prosecutors at the
Tokyo war crimes trial and orthodox Marxist historians, a rather strange
set of bedfellows.

Both of these groups imply that an over-riding sel

fishness drove the Japanese armies across Asia.

The prosecutors at the

Tokyo trial argued that the Japanese leaders, like the Nazis, were crim
inal representatives of an evil society who decided to expand their
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arbitrary power not only in Japan, but throughout the world.

The Marxist

writers added that this selfishness was inevitable, since Japan's leaders
were driven by the class dilemmas of modern capitalism.
In spite of occasional reincarnations, the conspiracy thesis has
faded from favor among more recent writers, probably because it is so
unsatisfying as an explanation of human action.

Many writers have pointed

out that Japan's leaders were neither criminal nor self-seeking; in fact,
they served their governments at considerable personal risk, and unlike
Hitler, they yielded their posts when their policies failed.

Far from

acting as agents of Japanese industry, they despised self-seeking capi
talists and hoped to restore prosperity to Japan and Asia in spite of
zaibatsu leaders. 2

As time has passed, then, Japan's leaders have come

to seem more complicated than the villains in a grade B movie.

3

Maruyama Masao, a political scientist at Tokyo University, has given
a more complex explanation of the motives of Japan's imperialists.

He

argues that they were nationalists who had a strong sense of mission, but
a weak sense of self.

Like most Japanese in the thirties, Maruyama implies,

Japan's military and civilian leaders lacked the strength of character to
stand up for democracy at home or to resist the actions of the young
officers and radical nationalists.

Because they were oppressed by Japan's

hierarchical society, Maruyama says, they transferred tyranny abroad.
Since they were raiseq to regard loyalty as the central core of value and
to regard themselves as the Emperor's most loyal servants, they believed
that they could do no wrong.

Consequently, their efforts to reform for

eign peoples merely reproduced the autocratic forms of Japanese domestic
relations across Asia.

In the end, Japan's leaders lost control of
-3

policy, became the "robots" of the radical right, and clanked onward to
destruction. 4

In Maruyama's eyes then, they were not really selfish, but

rather members of a bumbling generation who were driven by the evil nature
of their society.
In contrast to these rather dark visions, Akira Iriye and James B.
Crowley have proposed a clearly revisionist interpretation.

While Iriye

does not deny that Japan's leaders misread the changing international
scene, he stresses external factors as the cause of Japan's shift from
international cooperation to aggression.

The Japanese military correctly

concluded that the Washington treaties had failed to provide a framework
for peaceful economic expansion and stable relations with China and Russia.
Consequently, Japan's leaders believed that they had to impose a new order
in Asia, but found, once again, that the western powers were blocking
their way.

Thus, Iriye concludes that the reasons for Japan's expansion

lie not only in "the pathology of the Japanese mind," but also in the
"inherent contradictions and irrationalities of the modern world." S
Though the military took the wrong road, Iriye implies that Japan abso
lutely had to do something to tame the chaotic international scene.
James B. Crowley goes much further than Iriye in arguing for the
rationality of Japan's leaders.

These men, he says,were seeking the

traditional goals of the Meiji genro:
gress, and equality

~ith

national security, economic pro

the leading western nations.

In order to achieve

security, the Japanese had to assume a hegemonial position in East Asia;
an Asian bloc of economic and military allies would give them the ability
to fight a long war of attrition against America or Russia.

And even if

war did not come, Japan would be able to compete successfully with the
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other closed economic systems by controlling large markets.

Crowley

argues that these rational military leaders were able to control policy
until the fall of 1937, when civilians like Konoye, Hirota, and Hiranuma
took over the direction of the China incident and expanded it into a
holy war, thereby breaching the reasonable strategic limits which the
military had set.

Revision has come full circle:

for most of the

thirties, Crowley implies, Japan's leaders were typical members of a for
eign policy elite which seeks security for its country in competition
with the elites of other lands.

This rational portrait of Japanese im

perialism has led to a basic re-eva1uation of American responsibility for
the outbreak of the pacific war.

James MacGregor Burns voices the new

consensus when he refers to the Japanese-American war as a miscalculated
conflict.

Since the Japanese were only seeking a limited Asian sphere

and were not trying to conquer the world, they were no threat to American
security, and they only went to war with the United States reluctantly
after the Americans cut off their oil in July 1941.

6

At first glance, Japan's position in the world during the early
thirties does indeed seem insecure, and the fears of Japan's leaders seem
justified.

Economically, tariff barriers were rising.

Militarily, Russia

was recovering from the effects of the revolution, while the Anglo-Saxon
powers were insisting on maintaining their combined naval predominance.
Diplomatically, the growing nationalist and communist movements in China
vied with each other in campaigning against Japan's special interests on
the continent.

An over-riding concern for security seems rational enough

given these circumstances.
Yet a closer look yields a sharply contrasting picture. Economically,
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Japan was one of the first countries to recover from the depression, and
her foreign trade expanded in spite of tariff walls.

Militarily, the

Japanese were more secure in the early thirties than they had been at any
time previously; in fact, Japan had the most balanced military force in
the world.
America

Russia had a larger army, but no navy to speak of, while

and Britain had larger navies, but minuscule standing armies.

Given the isolated geographic position of Japan's home islands, the mil
itary could point to no clear and present military threat to the homeland.
Diplomatically, the thirties were even kinder to Japan than the twenties.
The rise of fascist regimes in Italy and Germany increasingly pinned
England and Russia in Europe, while the depression hardened the hearts of
America's isolationists in Congress against military spending and foreign
7
entanglements.
Left alone in Northeast Asia, Japan's leaders should
have had no difficulty protecting their continental possessions and home
islands from the weak and isolated Chinese or the preoccupied Russians.
And, in fact, Japan's leaders saw more opportunity than danger in the
international chaos of the thirties.
At first glance Crowley also seems correct when he argues that the
responsible officials in Tokyo controlled Japanese foreign policy in a
rational fashion, at least until 1937.

The government did set Japan's

foreign policy goals in a series of cabinet papers between 1933 and 1936.
But Mark Pea ttie has .:shown that Japanese colonels in the field could
sometimes have a decisive effect on the policy itself.

And even the

style of Japanese decision-making introduced fundamental irrationalities
into Japanese foreign policy.

Consider the way in which Japan's leaders

made their decisions in the thirties.
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Each of the major interest groups

appealed to the Imperial court functionaries and to Prince Saionji
Kimmocbi, tbe surviving genro, to adopt their programs.

Tbe imperial

advisors would then foster negotiations among the competing groups in
order to arrive at a consensus; when such a consensus appeared, the
Emperor would ratify it as national policy.8

The easiest way to arrive

at a consensus was to adopt all of tbe basic goals of the most powerful
groups, in spite of the fact that tbe Empire might lack the means to
achieve them simultaneously.
The balance of forces in this bargaining process increasingly tilted
toward the more radical military elements as the decade progressed.

The

Army and Navy provoked foreign crises, used the media which they controlled
to demand harsh measures, and appealed to their many supporters through
out the country; meanwhile, the political parties saw their power wane
throughout the decade, although they were able to block some of the more
radical proposals of the military by footdragging in Parliament.

9

With

commanders in the field acting semi-independently, and with this confused
process of decision going on in Tokyo, Japan's ambitions naturally out
stripped its reach.

Another factor helped to insure that Japan would

follow an aggressive course in world affairs:
angry men of the early Showa period.

the activities of the

By exploring the backgrounds and

activities of four of these determined advocates of expansion, we can
gain a clearer unders,;tanding of the motives which drove Japanese leaders
to seek a new empire.
Men of Tradition and Character
In order to understand what inspired Kato, Suetsugu, Koiso, and
-7

Ishiwara to advocate expansion abroad and reform at home, we must con
sider their early years, because for them the youth was father to the man
in a special way_

All of them were born between 1870 and 1889; therefore,

between 1890 and 1920 they witnessed almost unbroken economic and imperial
progress.

With the exception of Ishiwara, all of them fought with the

victorious forces during the Russo-Japanese war. 10

To them, therefore,

expansion and modernization marched shoulder to shoulder.
The four boys also shared a common social background.

With the

exception of Suetsugu, their fathers or grandfathers were samurai.

As

a result, they received a special moral training which shaped both their
careers and Japan's policies in later years.

As Robert B4fuh has pointed

out, the values which they learned at home grew into a national ideology
by the thirties when appeals for national sacrifice drew a strong response
from the country at large.

In 1937 the Ministry of Education summed up

this official doctrine in the famous Fundamentals of National Polity:
western individualism led to the deadends of capitalism, anarchism, and
socialism, while the Imperial way of loyalty and filial piety produced
11
harmony and peace.
At the heart of this central Japanese value system lay the concept
of on, the duty to repay benevolence received from one's parents, from
one's immediate master, and most important, from heaven, as represented
by the Emperor.

The samurai's duty was twofold:

If his master's realm

was threatened, he would die in its defence, thereby achieving salvation;
if placed in a position of power, he would serve as an example to the
rest of the state's citizens by working hard, living frugally and by treat
ing his inferiors with benevolence, while insisting on righteous action
-8

by those above.

In the Meiji years, the Emperor became the ultimate

focus of the citizens' feelings of loyalty; for the good soldier and
faithful citizen, then, the proper goal of all action was to help expand
the Emperor's benevolence by insuring the progress of the state.
member

Each

of the nation would work hard, live frugally, and contribute

what he could to building a better Japan.

If all sincerely did their

duty, none would become too wealthy, and all classes would live in har
mony.

12

Such, then, was the ideal which crystanized while our protagon

ists were growing up.
As young officers, our protagonists drank in this ethic at home, on
the drill field, and at school.

Their fathers lived lives of service,

first as han officials and then as government bureaucrats or officers in
the Meiji military and police forces.

At the lower military schools, the

boys received an education which consisted mostly of rigorous spiritual
toughening and technical military training.

The path to adulthood was

not always smooth and straight; Ishiwara Kanji was suspended twice for
kicking his sabre instructor "in the vitals," a grievous rebellion against
•
.
13
h 1S super10r.

In spite of occasional revolw, this moral training struck deep roots.
Throughout his career, Kato Kanji repeatedly stressed the need for the
soldiers to have a firm set of traditional beliefs, no matter how much
modern knowledge they might possess.

For Kato, the virtue of mutual

loyalty lay at the base of all Japanese values, for it united superior
and inferior in bonds

ofben~olence

and mutual affection.

Such loyalty

was the core of bushido, the warrior code which Kato recommended as a
cure for the distractions of the modern era.
-9

If the good Japanese followed

the true way, he would aid the weak, revere justice, and prize honor, all
in a spirit of self-sacrifice.

The First World War was a sign from

Heaven, Kato said, that the materialistic culture of the west had reached
a moral impasse and that Japan was the true, spiritual nation which had
a duty to extend its healing national ethic.

Ishiwara agreed.

In his

overview of war history he wrote, " • • • should we not drill into our
selves • . a profound belief in the kokutai [national essence] which must
be the driving force of that spirit by which a soldier, like a god, sac
rifices himself sincerely for his lord's country?,,14
Naturally throughout their lives, all of these men acted the part
of the loyal samurai.

But their conception of their role blended two

conflicting models of samurai behavior:
the man of determination [shishi}.

the loyal retainer [kashin] and

For most of their careers, they worked

within the system and rose steadily through the new military bureaucracies.
They were all good students who were selected early in their careers for
the General Staffs of their respective services, and all became military
intellectuals associated with the War Colleges.

Often they advanced

under the patronage of a famous superior; for example, Admiral Togo
Heihachiro was as
progress.

in~rumental

in KatD's career as Kato was in Suetsugu's

Loyal service had real, as well as

spiritual rewards.

But at critical periods in their careers and at major turning points
in the history of Japan's foreign relations, these men broke out of
normal channels and demanded that the nation change direction.

And they

acted not as robots of the radical right or young officers, but on their
own and in spite of possible damage to their futures.

A good man was

selfless; he shunned all desire for wealth and recognition, while
-10

serving his Emperor and nation.
not going well?

But what was his duty when things were

Then he had to revolt on behalf of the right policies,

even though he might fail, for his action would shame his superiors into
doing the right thing.

Those who actually did revolt were few, but they

could be sure of an honored place in Japan's historical memory, for they
had exhibited makoto--sincere self-denial, purity, and unplanned, headlong
action for the good of others. lS

If such men failed, they might still

have the comforting thought that their superiors would eventually adopt
the policies for which they had sacrificed.

Often, however, they could

hope to induce their superiors to reflect and adopt their policies immed
iately; in such cases, a promotion for the offender might result.

Vigor

ous advocacy, then, had both rewards and dangers; some of our protagonists
went on to promotions while others went into political exile.
Take as an example Admiral Kato Kanji.
the Navy General Staff.

In 1930 Kato was Chief of

During the naval disarmament crisis of 1930,

he turned his back on political preferment to follow a course of rugged
independence.

Kato feared that the politicians in London were bargaining

away Japan's existing margin of naval security and more important, its
hopes for further greatness.

Through his aide, Suetsugu, he declared

publicly that the Chief of the Naval General Staff was directly respon
sible to the Emperor for determining how much naval construction Japan
needed.

The politicians, Suetsugu said, were tampering with this right

of supreme command.

When Kato finally found himself outmaneuvered by

Prime Minister Hamaguchi, he-resigned in protest.

Kato's official career

had ended, and Suetsugu's rise halted temporarily.16
KOLSO Kuniaki and Ishiwara Kanji also acted with determination when
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they thought the nation was endangered.

In 1930 Major General Koiso, the

Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, involved him
self with the March plotters, who hoped to establish a military govern
ment by coup d'etat.

In the mid-thirties Koiso's political activities

earned him a temporary exile from the seats of

powe~

and Ishiwara was one

of the leaders of the Kwantung Army during its independent action in
Manchuria in 1931.

In the mid-thirties he continued to intervene in

politics and stand against the mainstream in foreign policy matters,
until finally he too was exiled from Tokyo.17

When these men saw their

country going wrong, they would act occasionally without regard to per
sonal consequences.

And in fact, they saw many dangers both abroad and

at home.
The Warring States
Kato, Suetsugu, Koiso, and Ishiwara all believed that competition
rather than cooperation was the underlying law of international relations,
and they naturally concluded that the Washington system was both unreal
istic and immoral.

Advocates of disarmament ignored the fact that nations

lived or died by the sword and that the nation which did not expand would
soon be outstripped.

And it seemed clear to these men that the paeans

to peace sung by western politicians merely served to cover the harsh
reality of capitalist exploitation in Asia.
From 1918 on, many influential figures in Japan distrusted the
Versailles and Washington systems.
Fumimaro, and Matsuoka

Y~suke

Men like Tokutomi Soho, Konoye

declared that the new Wilsonian order was

merely a device to preserve the old imperialistic order, and Admiral Kato
agreed.

As a military expert at the Washington conference, Kato fought
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so hard against establishing a 6/10 ratio between Japan and America that
the politicians had to take the question out of the hands of the naval
specialists' committee.

In the mid-twenties, Kata used the occasion of

a formal lecture to the Emperor on military affairs to explain his hatred
of the naval treaties.

KatS explained that the west was using the dis

armament system to secure "capitalistic and imperialistic" domination of
the Orient.

In the early nineteenth century, he said, England and America

had replaced Spain and Portugal as leaders in the eternal quest for
empire in the Pacific.

Japan, however, had entered the struggle late

and had failed to resist America's advance from Hawaii and Guam right up
to the Philippines which lay on Japan's very doorstep_

Then America and

Britain had tied Japan's hands by freezing battleship competition and by
fixing the territorial status quo.

Yet war would eventually be inevitable,

Kat~ concluded, since the urge to predominate was basic to human nature. lS
Suetsugu agreed.

In the mid-thirties he publicly explained that

international politics resembled the warring states period in Japanese
history--the years of feudal warfare before the reunification of the
country under the Tokugawa.

It was only natural, he said, that all nations

sought their own interests at the expense of others and that war resulted.
Military power was the key to life or death for a nation:
take the world; lose and your nation dies.

'~in

and you

There is no way around it."

As victors in the mogt recent war, Suetsugu said, it was natural that
America, England, and France were trying to preserve their gains, while
Germany, Italy, and Russia were reviving as rivals.

Japan would be

foolish to ignore the facts of international life.
Suetsugu also believed that the status quo powers had also extended
-13

their oppression to Asia.

Since the Chinese did not have the qualities

needed to stand up together as a nation, Suetsugu said, the western powers
were threatening to divide the continent up among themselves, just as
they had done to the rest of Asia.

The white powers were preserving

peace at the expense of the colored nations and not through a just bal
ance of interests and power; consequently, it was Japan's duty as the
only colored nation remaining free to establish justice and lasting peace.
Koiso and Ishiwara agreed.

In 1940 Koiso argued that the French had

retarded the economic progress of Indo-China by monopolizing trade and
investment there while discriminating against Japan.

In 1930 Ishiwara

declared that Japan's ultimate mission was to destroy lithe pressure of
the white race which is inhibiting our heaven sent mission .••• of saving
the Chinese people.,,19
To Kato and Suetsugu their first duty was clear:
down the prison

they had to pull

walls of naval disarmament and liberate Japan's pro

gressive conquering spirit.

Just as the Meiji leaders had resisted the

expansion of the west by modernizing and taking foreign colonies, the men
of Showa would help their eastern brothers survive and prosper.

Though

Kato had been cast down from the seats of power in the naval bureaucracy,
he and Suetsugu maneuvered relentlessly to rid their service of disarm
ament advocates.

By threatening to unleash the young officers and right

wing assassins, they ':managed to sweep their opponents out in 1933 and
replace them with their own followers, men like Osumi Mineo, Nagano
Osami, and Shimada

Shigetar~.

Between 1934 and 1937 these men led Japan

out of the disarmament system, accepted the Army's plans for expansion in
China, planned an advance against the west's colonies in South East Asia,
-14

and launched a spiralling naval race with England and America. 20
The foregoing argument seems to lead back to an older picture of
Japanese imperialism in which Japan's military masters plunged across
Asia in a burst of emotional anti-western Emperor worship.

But Kato and

Suetsugu not only were traditionalists, but also modernizers who sought
to make Japan the most modern military power in the world.

From 1890 to

1920 both men went to the west a number of times to bring back the latest
in military technology and strategic thought.

In 1897 Kato was a member

of the crew which went to England to take charge of the new battleship,
Fuji, which the British had built for Japan.

And in 1919 he led a mission

to survey the technical developments made by Germany.
went in person to study the

Suetsugu also

destroyer and submarine tactics which western

Admirals had developed during the World War.

This reliance on the west

for military ideas and technology must have proved galling for the proud
officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy.
By the mid-thirties, however, Japan was shaking off its dependence
on western military leadership and asserting its independence.

After

1920 Japan's naval builders stopped relying on western engineering and
between 1928 and 1934 Kato's disciples in the navy developed weapons which
they believed would make Japan secure in the western Pacific against
America.

New midget and heavy submarines, better bombers and torpedoes,

and most important, a, new super-battleship design made them confident that
Japan could advance to the south successfully.

Should America interfere,

Kato and Suetsugu had elaborated a strategy which they expected to yield
a Japanese victory.

Given the great distance which the American fleet

would have to travel from Hawaii to the Philippines, Japanese light forces
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would have time to wear the American forces down by repeated submarine
and air attacks.

Finally, the Japanese main fleet could pick its time

to close with the weakened Americans and use its superior battleship
°
21
strengt h to d eC1Od e t h e 1ssue.

To Kato and Suetsugu, then, it seemed

that Japan was prepared materially as well as morally to build a bene
volent empire.
In spite of their professionalism, however, there is an undertow of
tension running through their statements:

anger at the politicians who

agreed to end Japan's territorial growth; hostility against the white
races' domination in Asia; and rage at the selfish economic practices
of private enterprise.

They urged Japan to get back to basics:

in Japan's national tradition and a return to the realism of the

a faith
past.

Most important, they asked their fellow citizens to remember that the god
of war was a permanent, though uninvited, guest at the international
banquet.

But these latter day samurai worried not only about the dangers

of the international scene, but also about the internal troubles of their
homeland.
A Disordered Realm
To these men, society seemed increasingly out of joint in the twenties
and thirties.

Instead of an harmonious realm in which each citizen re

mained in his station and loyally served the whole nation, new men had
risen up to vie for individual profit and private power; economic growth
had given the capitalists and their errand boys, the party politicians,
real political influence.

And in traditional eyes, of course, -public

power used for private purposes was immoral.

-16

The traditional Japanese ethic dictated not only proper political
behavior, but also a special economic role for both government and the
citizen.

In the Tokugawa han all Japanese, whether their station was

high or low, were supposed to pull together for the common good.

Hard

work would repay their debts both to their parents and to the Emperor.
For its part

the government would encourage the virtues of selfless

diligence, harmonious cooperation, and thrift.

The samurai officials

would also be frugal with their tax money and invest it wisely to increase
production and, therefore,

add to the wealth of the whole realm.

Since

most men were not strong enough in character to follow the government's
rules willingly, of course, the han officials would step in to discourage
wasteful consumption; to the traditional man, reform meant cutting govern
mental luxury and confiscating the estates of overfed merchants. 22

The

citizens of the good realm, then, would strive to be miniature samurai-
selfless, diligent, frugal, obedient, and cooperative.
But as the twentieth century progressed, Japan was far from being
a harmonious realm.

In 1910 the Army leaders intervened directly at home

to rebuild social order.

Generals Tanaka Giichi and Ugaki Kazushige helped

to build the Imperial Military Reserve Association, which had 14,000
branches enrolling three million members by 1936; auxiliaries for women
and youth brought the total membership to approximately twelve million.
The Army encouraged members of these groups to cultivate

a spirit of

loyalty to village, Army, nation, and Emperor, in order to prepare for
local and national emergencies.
order mounted.
emergency.

23

With the onset of the depression, dis

In September 1935, Suetsugu declared that Japan faced an

The foundation of the nation, the farmers, were rapidly grow

ing poorer, and many common laborers were unemployed.
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Japan's growing

population was struggling to exist on a static economic base.
emergency was not only economic--it was also spiritual.

But the

Gaps between

the classes were widening, he warned, and communist agitation was grow
ing.

The solution for Japan '.s troubles, he said, lay in external econ

omic expansion for which strong military backing was essential; the econ
omic and colonial walls raised by the imperial powers would not fall before
anything else.

Yet the government was ignoring the plight of its people.

The politicians spent their time struggling for power while the merchants
were merely seeking to "pile up wealth without interference."

Suetsugu

warned that in the eighteenth century, the Dutch government had followed
the advice of their merchants, disarmed, and inevitably declined, while
their English counterparts had listened to the Admirals, built a great
24
.
navy, and won a prosperous empLre.

The lesson was clear:

the government would have to rein in the mer

chants and cast out the politicians.
the first Konoye

~abinet

In 1938 Suetsugu was a member of

which was trying to introduce strict economic

controls and prepare Japan for a long struggle to build an empire.

He

was outraged when Ikeda Seihin, the representative of the economic com
munity in the government, urged invoking Article Six of the mobilization
law in order to control the wages and movements of the workers while
neglecting to mention the need for any controls on dividends.
the cabinet and in public, Suetsugu

dema~dthat

Both in

the government strictly

limit private profits and also levy forced loans on private capitalists.
But Suetsugu and the economic planners did not win; and in 1940, Koiso
was still calling for an "end to the dealings of free competition" and
full national management of the economy.25
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In the eyes of these men,

Both Ishiwara and Koiso were impressed by Germany's defeat in World
War I.

German strategy had been good, and the Germans

had used their

interior lines well to concentrate their forces where they were needed.
But in the end, the inferior generals and weapons of the allies had won
the victory--simp1y by grinding the Germans down.

Attrition was the rule

in modern war, Ishiwara and Koiso reasoned, and a great power had to be
self-sufficient both in war material and in financial resources.

Ishiwara

believed that Japan might have lost the Russo-Japanese war, if the Tsar's
generals had understood the realities of the attrition strategy.

Koiso

was so impressed by the changing nature of warfare in 1917 that he began
to plan for a war of attrition despite his relatively junior status on
the General Staff.

Using his position as head of the topographical

section, he calculated Japan's resource reserves and then matched them
against expected levels of consumption at full mobilization.

He then

surveyed the continental sources from which gaps in Japanese production
might be filled.

In the end he wrote a grab bag mobilization plan

which covered a wide variety of Asian resources and included prescribing
proper economic relationships, especially the restoration of "harmony
between labor and capital."

By March 1930, Koiso was so concerned about

the lack of planning that he backed a coup in which his fellow officers
hoped to establish a military government.
for naught--the plot fai1ed.

But Koiso had risked his career

26

Ishiwara shared Koiso's longing to plan for a war of attrition.

By

the late twenties, Ishiwara's studies of war history convinced him that
Japan would have to expand and that it would have to adopt Napoleon's
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strategy of making each conquered land supply the fuel for further cam
paigns.

In 1931, when he was on the Genam1 Staff of the Kwantung army

in Manchuria, he took up the standard which had slipped from Koiso's hand.
With the depression bearing down hard on Japan at home, with Chinese
pressure on Manchuria rising abroad, and with the party politicians and
capitalists under attack, Colonel Ishiwara and his fellow officers coldly
planned, set off, and expanded the invasion of Manchuria.

If modern

economic planning could not begin at home, then it would start abroad.
After a hard fight in Tokyo, the Kwantung Army won the right to rule
Manchoukuo, and Ishiwara started to plan the new nation's economic develop
ment.

And the new Manchoukuo was a model of complete military control of

a national economy.

Japanese officers worked at all levels of the new

state administration, and Japanese managers participated in hundreds of
new joint ventures throughout the country.

And all of these officers and

bureaucrats danced to the tune played by the central administration of
the Kwantung army.

But Koiso, then Chief of Staff in the Kwantung army,

and Ishiwara tried to see that the zaibatsu did not exploit Manchoukuo
for private gain. 27

Economic planning would ease the way for the two

nations and the military, but not for the merchants.
Between 1933 and 1937 Ishiwara, Koiso, and others in the Army pressed
the Japanese government to extend full economic planning from Manchoukuo
to the entire Japanese empire and to acquire the resources which Japan
still lacked.

Their sense of urgency increased when Stalin reacted to

Japan's advance in Manchuria and to the rise of Hitler by starting a
large scale rearmament program.

Though Koiso went into eclipse after

1933, Ishiwara became the leading figure in the search for an integrated
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Imperial economy; in 1935 he became head of the strategy section of the
General Staff in Tokyo, and in 1936 he became chief of a new War Direction
section of the General s·taff.

As a result of his research in these pos

itions, he soon decided that Japan's economic base was still too narrow
and that Japan would have to gain access to the coal and iron of north
China and the cotton and foodstuffs of south China.

Consequently, he urged

his superiors to adopt a policy of gradual penetration in China, and the
Army leaders followed his advice by setting up new puppet regimes in the
north.

28

At the same time, Ishiwara and economic planners from the South
Manchurian Railroad Company were studying Russia's five year plans, in
order to write a similar one which would integrate Japan's economy with
that of Manchoukuo.

By the spring of 1936 he had prepared a "Five Year

Plan for Leading Industries" which covered many spheres of the new Imper
ial government and economy.

Ishiwara wanted the national government to

abolish the political parties and establish a military dictatorship.29
He proposed that the government control the capital markets, nation
alize key industries such as electric power, automobiles, heavy machinery,
and shipbuilding, and force the industrialists to hit targets set by the
government.

After a year of infighting, Ishiwara and the planners were

able to have the Army present a curtailed version of their five year plan
to the Cabinet in lat~ May 1937. 30

But the military and the leaders of

the Konoye cabinet could not persuade the Diet to accept national mobil
iz~tion

until April 1938, and by then the Japanese government was enmeshed·

in the China incident.
ment had to de-emphasize

Consequently, to Ishiwara's dismay, the govern
investmentf~r
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developing greater industrial

capacity in favor of increasing immediate production in existing industry.
By 1937 Ishiwara's power was waning.

In 1931 and in 1935 he had

helped to launch Japan on the parallel paths of continental expansion and
economic planning, and in 1936-37 he again risked his career by facing
against the mainstream.

As Chinese resistance grew after the Sian inci

dent in 1936, as Russian Production blossomed into weapons in the Far
East, and as the western powers threatened a full scale naval race,
Ishiwara began to doubt the wisdom of further immediate expansion.

Ever

the activist, in 1936 he resisted the Navy's plans for large scale building
and an advance to the south, and in 1937 he fought against the Army's
invasion of central China.

It would take five years, he warned, to create

the strength Japan needed for a long war with Russia, and another five
years to prepare for a war against the western powers.
in vain and soon found himself exiled.

But he protested

3l

The East Asian League and The New Order
Ishiwara's careful preparation of a modern economic base to support
a large empire might lead one to conclude that he was a coolly rational
leader.

But there was another, more emotional side to Ishiwara, for he

too was hoping to recreate a good moral order in Japan and Asia.

Through

out his career Ishiwara tried not only to ,lay the economic foundation for
the Japanese empire, but also to overcome the tension between his tradi
tional beliefs and his role as a modernizer.

Like Kat~, Suetsugu, and

Koiso, Ishiwara believed that Japan was duty-bound to defend and expand
eastern spiritual values against western imperialism.
But Ishiwara's version of eastern ethics had a special, millenial
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twist.

At the late age of thirty he converted to the Nichiren sect of

Buddhism, and made up for his tardy entrance by typically vigorous
preaching; in 1927 he converted a number of people with his powerful
sermons.

The followers of Nichiren comprised the smallest of the four

major Buddhist sects in prewar Japan, but due to the special nature of
their beliefs, they were among the more active religious groups in Japan.
Basically, the followers of Nichiren believed that faithful repetition
of a chant praising the Lotus Sutra would bring them salvation, but the
pull of the doctrine on Ishiwara was far stronger than this simple formula
for redemption.
The teachings of Nichiren appealed both of Ishiwara's sense of duty
as a soldier and to his pride as a Japanese, for they provided him with
a great mission on behalf of eastern ethics.

It was Ishiwara's task as

a believer to emulate the Bodhissatva of Superb Action, just as Nichiren
himself had done.

According to the scriptures, Nichiren had found medieval

Japan shrouded in the darkness of false Buddhist and Shinto beliefs, and
he had dedicated his whole life to combatting error.

The master had pre

dicted that an age of even greater darkness would follow his persecution
and death, but that a group of latter day saints would one day revive the
faith.

They would then convert Japan, reconcile the Emperor and his

people, and unify the beliefs of Asia and the world.

Ishiwara saw no

need to separate his ;re1igious beliefs from his work as a military thinker;
in one of his first studies he wrote, "Nichiren said, 'In order to accom
p1ish the unification of re1igions .•.. which is the fundamental condition
for complete world peace, it will first be necessary for a single, epochal
war to occur in this transient world.'"
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For Ishiwara, the tragic slaughter of the First World War proved
that mankind was entering the final days of darkness which Nichiren had
predicted, and he expected that a great conflict between Japan and Amer
ica, the final representatives of eastern and western values, was "not
far distant.tI

During this destructive war, Ishiwara said, Nichiren had

predicted that a good King would rise up, become a Buddha, unify Asia,
and spread the law through the world.

"None other than the Emperor of

Greater Japan," he wrote, "will occupy the position of this wise King in
the future world war."

Despite the Buddhist framework, then, Ishiwara's

beliefs echo Japan's traditional morality.

The Japanese Emperor was the

source. of all virtue, and it was the duty of his loyal servants to spread
his light:
By our inevitable victory [in the struggle] for the unification
of eastern and western culture which is coming in the Pacific,
we must promote in the world the great ideals which our nation
has held since its founding, and our first and foremost task
lies in carrying out this heaven-decreed work.

In short, we are

going to be victorious in the afore-mentioned world war simply
because our heaven sent task is to save the people of the world
[by acting] sincerely, without taking into account questions of
our own profit or livelihood. 33
For Ishiwara, Japanese expansion was a moral duty.
Naturally, Ishiwara's outlook shaped his vision of the proper struc
ture for the good empire.

Japan would establish an East Asian League

comprised of Manchoukuo, China, Southeast Asia, and Australia.

As a

first step, he said, the military should unify the homeland by aiding
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the political parties which supported the League.

After their domestic

success, Japan's new leaders would then organize and streamline economic
production in both the conquered areas and the homeland, thereby achiev
ing "great progress for our industries and a great reform for China."
All peoples in the League would look to the sage Emperor for spiritual
guidance, while his servants in the Japanese military would bring the
material benefits of the modern world to them.

By saving Asia in this

world, Ishiwara said, the Japanese would save themselves in the next.
Ishiwara was serious about helping Asia:

in the new Manchoukuo,

he said, "Japanese and Chinese should stand in a position of complete
equality. ,,34

And Manchoukuo--in large part Ishiwara's creation--would

serve as a model for the rest of the League, since it was founded on good
eastern principles:

follow Heaven's way and bring peace to the people;

Harmony among the Five Races; Kingly Way--Earthly Paradise; International
Harmony, etc.

35

The Kings of the Asian nations would rule as Pu Yi, the

King of Manchoukuo, did; they would be the loyal vassals of the true
Emperor in Japan.

This utopian vision appealed

to Suetsugu as well.

October 1934, he endorsed the idea of an East Asian League.
asked, "is the mission of our Japan?

In

"What," he

It is to accomplish the unification

of eastern and western culture and bring peace based on justiceto the
world.

This is our ultimate goal."

But it would be hard

peaceful world 'in one· jump," he said, and, therefore, Japan

to create a
would first

have to bring harmony to the Orient and develop Asia's resources.

36

It

is clear, then, that these men were not merely careful economic planners
nor cold eyed military strategists, but also latter day samurai driven by
the desire ·to restore selflessness and harmony to Japan and Asia.
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At the end of 1937, as fighting spread across central China, Suetsugu
had a chance to strike a decisive blow for the East Asian League.

In

December, the cabinet of Prince Konoye Fumimaro faced a fateful decision:
the Army's General Staff officers wanted to negotiate an end to the fight
ing in China, in order to dodge the

diffic~

task of invading southern

China while maintaining a solid defense against the Russians in the
north; Konoye, the field armies, and supporters of the East Asian League
wanted to press on, destroy Chiang's government, and replace it with a
federation of puppet regimes modeled on Manchoukuo.

In order to counter

act the counsels of the General Staff, Konoye brought Suetsugu into the
government as Home Minister, and he expanded the Inner Cabinet to include
him in the foreign policy debates.
After his appointment, Suetsugu announced publicly that the moment
had come to bring perpetual peace to East Asia.

It might be necessary,

he said, to expel white people from East Asia, in order to liberate the
colored races and secure for them the benefits of equality with the white
races.

In the inner cabinet, Suetsugu sought to widen the war, make a

complete break with Chiang and secure the recognition of the puppet
regimes which the field armies were organizing in China.

In the end

Suetsugu's bright vision of the East Asian League blinded Japan's leaders
to the reservations raised by the General Staff.

On January 11, 1938 the

Japanese government demanded that China join the coprosperity sphere, and
.
37
five days later Konoye broke relations with Chiang.
After ten months of hard campaigning by Japan's armies in China,
Konoye announced that the Kuomintang had been reduced to a local regime
and that the time had come to establish a New Order in East Asia.
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The

new system would be an integrated confederation of East Asian regimes,
each cooperating to improve the economic and political well-being of the
bloc as a whole.

No longer would China suffer from western imperialist

exploitation; instead peace, harmony, and progress would reign as each
nation looked to Japan for political guidance along the Kingly way, and
economic direction along the path to modernization.

Ishiwara's dream

was taking shape.
But before the enthusiasts of the Asian League could complete their
task abroad, they first

had to install the new order at home.

Through

out the thirties, Kato, Suetsugu, Ishiwara, and Koiso had been calling
for national unity, harmony, and reform, but much to their chagrin, the
politicians continued to squabble and the merchants doggedly resisted full
mobilization even after the outbreak of the China incident.

By 1940 the

international crisis in Europe and the drive for internal harmony in Japan
reached a linked crescendo.

In August 1940, Koiso Kuniaki joined a chorus

of voices declaring that the time had come to exploit the opportunity
presented by the rise of the Axis powers in Europe.

At home, Koiso said,

all classes should unite in sinking their ,iindividual desires," and the
new Konoye cabinet should

dis~lve

the political parties and undertake

fundamental reform of the government and educational systems.
Within three months Konoye had absorbed the political parties into
the Imperial Rule

Ass~stance

Association (with Suetsugu as Vice President)

and full economic mobilization began; Konoye had finally produced the
controlled economy and harmonious political order for which Suetsugu,
Ishiwara and Koiso longed.

38

In addition, as Koiso wished, Japan

strengthened its connection with the Axis powers and expanded the title
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of the New Order in East Asia to "The Greater Asian Coprosperity Sphere."
But Koiso knew that this enlarged Asian League would have to include the
western colonies in Southeast Asia if it were to be truly self-sufficient.
And in the summer of 1940, the Konoye cabinet hesitated before risking
war with the west.

Once again it took an inside activist to harden the

hearts of Japan's leaders for the fateful decision.
The Southern Advance
Just as he had risen to the challenge in 1930, Koiso was ready again
ten years later.

Koiso believed that the war in Europe provided an

"epochal chance" for Japan to acquire the resources necessary to make
self-sufficency possible.

The surveys which he had begun in 1917 would

have real meaning if Japan advanced south and acquired the oil, rubber,
and tin of South East Asia.

Therefore, as Colonial Minister under Hira

numa and yonai in 1939 and 1940, Koiso acted as a partisan of both the
Axis alliance and the southern advance.

While still in the Yonai cab

inet, Koiso embarassed the government by publicly denouncing Dutch oppres
sion in the East Indies.
In late July, the leaders of the new cabinet, Prime Minister Konoye
and Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke, considered sending Koiso as chief
negotiator on a mission to the Dutch East Indies in order to secure in
creased oil shipments peacefully.

But Koiso continued his campaign for

a full southern advance by military means.

In a remarkable series of

memos he called for the expansion of the East Asian League not only to
the East Indies but through the whole western Pacific; Japan, he said,
should plan:
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the formation of an East Asian Economic League which would in
clude not merely Japan, Manchuria, and China, but also French
Indo-China, Thaila.nd, Malaya, Burma, and the Dutch East Indies;
in the future we should also absorb North Sakhalin, the Maritime
provinces [of Russia], the Philippines, and Oceania; finally,
we should extend the boundaries of the economic sphere to the
90th .... and l80th longitudes [Australia, New Zealand, the Gil
berts, Midway, and the Aleutians].
Koiso concluded that the basic policy of the League lay in "uniting and
synthesizing the entire economic strength of the various parts of Asia,
establishing an independent Asian economy, and coping [thereby] with
America and Europe."
Yet Koiso did not believe that Japan's goals were purely selfish.
By moving into Southeast Asia, Japan would liberate the oppressed colonial
peoples in the western colonies.

On the political front, Koiso said,

Japan would substitute the Japanese Emperor for the Dutch Queen and the
British King, but allow the natives to choose a ruler to mediate between
their provincial governments and Tokyo.
move closer to complete self-rule.

And gradually the natives would

In the interim, the Japanese Army

would provide for internal order and self-defense, but the officers would
be careful to respect local customs.

On the economic front, Japan would

set up a common market, establish bureaus of experts to plan development,
and eventually integrate the economies of the colonies and the homeland.
Eventually the East Asian bloc would be able to negotiate on the basis of
equality with the western empires.
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Koiso insisted that Japan start south immediately.

If he were sent

to the Dutch East Indies, he said, he wanted a fleet and an expeditionary
force along to back him up.

He would demand that the Dutch station Japan

ese troops in the colony and integrate their economy into the economic
league.

And Suetsugu publicly supported Koiso's call for an early ad

vance to the south.

"Today, Ii he said, "is the world's warring states

period," and in these dangerous days Japan had to acquire oil to ensure
the security of the coprosperity sphere.

But Koiso had once again sac

rificed his immediate advancement to his vision.

The General Staffs of

both services insisted that a southern advance should only be undertaken
after careful planning and full mobilization of Japan's economic and
, h t. 39
m1'I"1tary m1g

Konoye withdrew Koiso as his candidate for the mission.

Yet in fact Koiso and Suetsugu had won.

By the spring of 1941, both

the rearmament programs adopted in 1936 and the economic planning which
started in 1938 had provided Japan with a tempting, though temporary
advantage over the western powers.

In spite of the China incident, the

Japanese Navy had built the midget and long range submarines, the light
surface forces, the aircraft, and the super-battleships which it needed
to carry out Suetsugu's attrition and ambush strategy.

And the Cabinet

Planning Board had ordered the stockpiling of key resources and had
designated foreign material sources to provide for a war of attrition.
With the Russians tied down by Hitler's invading armies, Japan was ready
to move against the British, the Dutch, and--if necessary--the Americans. 40
The long search for a good, harmonious, and secure empire, begun in the
offices and studies of

Kat~,

Suetsugu, Koiso, and Ishiwara, ended when
-31

Japan's planes struck at the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, and at
Hawaii.

By 1942 the East Asian League was a reality.

Conclusion
Koiso, Ishiwara, Kate, and Suetsugu were typical of the men who made
Japanese foreign policy during the thirties.

They were not sword-swing

ing fanatics, nor selfish tools of the capitalists, nor indeed farsighted
military bureaucrats, but rather latter day models of the modernizing
Meiji samurai.

For the most part they worked within the system, but

occasionally their consciences called them to take a public stand.
they did, they were remarkably successful:

When

Kate and Suetsugu helped to

force Japan out of the disarmament treaties and into a full advance in
China and South East Asia; Koiso and Ishiwara succeeded in having succes
sive governments adopt an aggressive continental policy, economic plan
ning, and the ideal of an East Asian League.
The constancy and tenacity of these men is striking.

They worked

hard to see that Japan had the most modern methods, strategies, and
weaponry, even though they had to bring them in from the west.

They be

lieved that military and economic modernization would help Japan build a
new order in East Asia based on the virtues which made Japan great:

each

citizen of the League would work diligently for the common good; each ruler
would loyally follow the example set by the Emperor; mankind's debt to
heaven would be repaid.

The Emperor would show the way to peace and

order in Asia and the world, just as he had done for Japan in the Meiji
era.

For the nation, western technology would help eastern ethics reign

in Asia; for Kato, Koiso, Ishiwara, and Suetsugu, the good empire would
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bind up the eastern and western halves of their hearts.

Their dream ended

badly, of course, for they had fatally misjudged both the likelihood of
their own military success and the receptivity of their future subjects
to the East Asian League, but their failure does not give us a license
to misunderstand what drove

the~nor

to underestimate the seriousness of

their purposes and the danger they posed to international stability.
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